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Online Deliberative Discourse and Conflict Resolution
Abstract
States and conflicting groups must get together at some point and engage in communication in an effort at
conflict resolution. This paper examines the relationship between the Internet, deliberative discourse, and
ethnopolitical groups in conflict. It focuses briefly on the public sphere but with specific reference to its role in
democratic discourse in the online environment. It makes the argument that the online environment is
uniquely capable of both constructing new and novel public spheres while at the same time establishing
conditions of communicative contact conducive to conflict resolution. The Internet public sphere is
particularly strong with respect to fostering new points of contact that are free from the constraints of society
systems. Deliberative democratic theory can be adapted to the context of ethnopolitical conflict and Internet
technology to open up new communicative spaces for problem solving. These new spaces can create a more
diverse conversational environment, encourage a task orientation, and improve democratic discussion by
creating argument-based conversations that are not as polarizing. Online communities are posed as contexts
for reorganizing discourse in such a way as to increase the mutual obligation and interdependence that is
central to the intersection of democracy and conflict resolution.
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INTRODUCTION 
 Clearly, communication is always an alternative to violence. In fact, it is the 
only morally legitimate alternative. But face-to-face communication is not always 
possible and sometimes groups in conflict require technological assistance for 
communicative contact. It is a challenge to find new ways to enhance the quality of 
mass participation in the democratic communication process, and stimulate new 
communicative practices. The primary goal of this article is to defend the claim that 
the Internet has potential to organize entirely new networks of communication, 
augment political debate, and enrich the quality of deliberation for all communities 
but especially those that are ethnically and geographically divided. For example, I 
argue that Israelis and Palestinians can activate a public sphere using the internet to 
move from conflict to peace. In support of this claim I will do three things: first, I 
will briefly restate the important relationship between a public communicative sphere 
and democracy. This is essentially the question of how decision making in a society 
acquires moral legitimacy. Secondly, I will quickly review three models of democratic 
legitimization but focus on the third which is deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy entails a special form of rational communication, but the conditions of 
this form of communication can vary from formal authorized discussions to amateur 
political discourse that still has transformative value with respect to opinions and 
judgments. Third, I will focus on the specific nature of deliberative communication 
with particular emphasis on online contact. These Internet discussions provide an 
initial glimpse into the nature and structure of online arguments and suggest 
directions for future work and recommendations. 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 It is not necessary to recount here Habermas’s account of how imperfect 
democratic discourse can be improved. Still, it bears underscoring that there is a very 
important way in which a democratic citizenry enriches the political process. The 
availability of deliberative communicative participation improves the mix of policy 
and holds leaders accountable. More importantly, deliberation legitimizes and lends 
moral weight to the decision making process. Much has been written about 
democracy and its advantages in terms of rights, moral legitimacy, freedom, and 
political equality (cf. Dahl 1998). But these advantages are only realized in the 
deliberative process. It is the opportunity to communicate and have potential 
influence that sustains democratic principles. Habermas’s grandest hopes are to 
reformulate the morality of lawmaking and this can only happen with a highly 
activated and engaged citizenry. Increased decentralization is necessary to achieve a 
goal of pluralistic decision making. The tendency for citizens to identify with larger 
groups and direct their loyalty to organizations such as political parties is 
destabilizing to pluralistic democracies. The internet can play an important role in the 
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decentralization that is necessary to ensure that small discourse communities are 
included in the deliberative process.  
 One of the goals of smaller discourse communities is to instill the habits of 
communication so that agreement and decision making are encouraged. Learning the 
proper practices of democratic discourse increases the likelihood that divergent 
groups can find a way to improve dialogue with others who are from dissimilar 
backgrounds. Some of Habermas’s (1984) earlier work, which called for spontaneous 
publics formulated around the “lifeworld” of society, has been criticized as 
unrealizable. But recent work recognizes a form of discourse that is pragmatic 
(Habermas 1987, 1996) and calls for a difficult but achievable form of discourse.  
 Habermas begins with the distinction between political discourse and everyday 
communication. This distinction has increasingly found its way into communication 
and political science literature (cf. Schudson 1997; Scheufele 2000; Wyatt, Kim, & 
Katz 2000) and proposes that political conversation only serves democracy if it is 
truly deliberative. That is, not just any type of discussion is acceptable. A casual 
“chat” about political events is not deliberative discourse. For communication to 
serve democratic principles it must include the presentation of differences and 
disagreements. The power of deliberation and the public sphere emerges from the 
existence of different opinions and backgrounds engaged in dispute over issues of 
substance.  
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AS A MODEL OF LEGITIMACY 
 A theoretical link between democracy as a macro conflict resolution strategy 
and communication as the micro context for decision making and relationship 
change is a key issue in the analysis that appears below. Ethnically divided societies 
who are trying to work out problems require a deliberative process that is part of the 
democratic process. This process must realize democratic procedures including 
freedom of expression and the rights to political organization and activity. The 
deliberative democratic process is the most fundamental guarantee of these rights. 
The deliberative process makes it possible to get from issues to systems (Lederach 
1997). In other words, a focus on an immediate micro issue will be more useful if its 
discussion and potential resolution have broader structural implications.  
 An example from the work of Hertz-Lazarowitz and Eden (2002) will be 
instructive here. Hertz-Lazarowtiz and Eden (2002) report on a peace education 
program in Acre, Israel that was a response to “voices that express distress, fear of 
the other, and discrimination in Acre” (211). Israeli-Jews and Israeli-Arabs would 
argue about the conditions in the cities with the Jews sayings things like “this is going 
to be an Arab City in 10 years….We are on the losing end” (211).  And the Arabs in 
contrast would say “Look at our schools, 1,300 children are crowded into one 
building that does not abide by the security regulations….The Jews, by comparison, 
have a fine school for every 300 students” (211). An argument between two citizens 
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of Acre could be viewed as an interpersonal difference on a micro level and require 
resolution between the individuals only, a resolution that would solve the problem by 
resolving the issue that prompted the disagreement. At another structural level, the 
problem might be defined as disfigured social relationship that needed redefinition. 
A conflict resolution specialist might decide that stereotypes and bias were at work 
and the solution to the problem lay in training in stereotype reduction and dialogue 
designed for deeper relationship change. The subsystem level focuses on a system of 
relationships that is smaller than society. Thus, neighborhood groups or parent 
associations in the schools might take up this issue. In the case reported by Hertz-
Lazarowitz and Eden (2002) the community had formed a Forum of School 
Principals that became an organized structural entity.  
 The model of deliberative democracy described in this paper is most 
productive for raising both “issue” and “system” perspectives. It responds to some 
of the weaknesses of typical dialogue approaches (cf. Maoz & Ellis 2006) by having 
impact beyond micro interpersonal relations. This is especially true of subsystems 
that act as a bridge between immediate social relations and broader structural 
concerns. The Forum for School Principals began as a forum for the simple 
exchange of thoughts but became the foundation for citywide problems. This forum 
did not “deliberate” according to principles and issues described here or other 
explanations of deliberative communication (e.g. Elster 1998), but they did realize 
that a “change in our mode of communication” (213) was necessary. A deliberative 
democratic process provides an opportunity to address problems in the interpersonal 
context where communication is structured toward solving problems that overlap 
with the structured environment of counterparts, and thus create opportunities for 
social transformation. It is particularly powerful at connecting local and system 
concerns. On yet another level the problem might be seen as symptomatic of larger 
societal structures that sustain discrimination and prejudice. The solution would be 
to change society.  Clearly, macro-systemic levels, such as The Israeli Ministry of 
Education in this case, must create opportunities and cooperate to improve the 
likelihood of success in social transformation of problems. But these mid level 
subsystems, as Lederach (1997) explains, are imperative for comprehensive and 
integrative solutions. 
 Democratic solutions to problems that emerge from ethnically divided 
societies deepen the legitimacy of a particular system of governance and problem 
solving. Israelis and Palestinians are caught in an intractable conflict where each side 
delegitimizes the other. The best way to elide these differences is to find a structural 
entity that is morally entitled to wield power. Deliberative democratic processes 
respond to two conditions of intractable ethnopolitical conflicts. These are (1) that 
such conflicts are between collectives and not individuals, and (2) that the conflict 
involves considerable inequalities. These mean that resolution techniques must tack 
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back and forth between individuals and collectives, and must have the moral 
legitimacy to transcend the inequalities.  
The most elemental model of democracy is based on elections. Most people see 
elections as the basic source of democratic moral authority. The problem is that 
citizenship is limited to the electoral choice among candidates. Ordinary citizens do 
not choose issues and it is possible to elect people who hold positions that are 
contrary to the interests of the many people. Although elections are supposed to 
maximize incentives for those who are elected to remain accountable to a citizenry, 
such elections are subject to manipulation, abuse, and a failure of genuine obligation 
to a constituency. A second source of democratic legitimacy is direct democracy. It 
has a constituency deciding on agendas and issues by direct votes. People choose 
freely their own political fate and direct democracy is appealing as a model of 
legitimacy. Still, direct democracy is cumbersome and, more importantly, it fails to 
inform and actualize its participants. Nothing ensures that citizens will have 
informed opinions or that they will give thought to the impact of the decision on 
others. The “losers” in an argument or initiative have not necessarily been included 
in the solutions, nor have they consented to be governed by the winning position. 
The assumption of assumed consent is too abstract to bear moral weight.  
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY  
Deliberative democracy is rooted in the advantages that accrue from reciprocity. 
As Gutmann and Thompson (2004) explain “The basic premise of reciprocity is that 
citizens owe one another justifications for their institutions, laws, and public policies 
that collectively bind them” (133). This means that justice and the legitimate 
acceptance of social and political constraints on a group must emerge from a process 
where all parties have had ample opportunity to engage in mutual reason-giving. 
From reciprocity flows respect for the other. Gutmann and Thompson (2004) also 
refer to publicity and accountability as essential conditions of deliberative democracy. 
That is, discussion and decision making must be public to ensure justifiability, and 
that officials who make decisions on behalf of others must be accountable. Binding 
decisions lose moral legitimacy to the extent that they have been made in a manner 
unavailable to the public, or by individuals who are not accountable to 
constituencies.  
 What is particularly important about deliberative democracy from a 
communication perspective is its ability to transform the perspective of the 
individual. Election centered and direct democratic processes value the individual but 
focus primarily on the opportunity to participate. Deliberative processes draw on 
communication in the form of discussion and argument with the aim to change the 
motivations and opinions of individuals. The deliberative process contributes to a 
changing sense of self and identity because participants are immersed in a social 
system that manufactures new ways to think about problems and orient toward 
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others. This deliberative social system moves people out of their parochial interests 
and contributes to a broader sense of community mindedness, as well as providing 
new information that clarifies and informs opinions. This is a fundamental identity 
widening process. Identity widening is the act of extending and enlarging one’s 
identity so that it includes more groups, people, and ideas. It can be thought of 
expanding concentric circles. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) refer to this as the 
recategorization processes. Very simply, you recategorize your cognitive 
representation of multiple groups with distinct boundaries into one group with more 
common boundaries. Hence, if an Israeli-Jew moves from a rigid definition of 
membership in his own group with strict boundaries (that include only, for example, 
Judaism, Zionism, Holocaust, Eretz Israel) to an identity that includes Palestinians 
through universal humanistic values or recognition of Palestinian national and 
political aspirations, then that Israeli-Jew has “widened” his identity. A 
communication perspective on conflict resolution considers identity widening to be 
at the core of change because settling ethnic conflicts is more than a legislative trick 
or new way to divide the pie. Rather, deliberation is uniquely able to marry the 
process of solving practical issues to the psychological and interpersonal changes that 
are conducive to conflict resolution. 
 The characteristic discourse of deliberative democracy must be “practical.” In 
other words, discourse that results in legitimate rules and provisions for the groups 
that produce them. Freedom to participate, equality, and a cooperative search for 
information and solutions are all part of this practical discourse (Habermas 1996). 
Moreover, divided groups trying to solve problems and improve relationships must 
listen to all voices, present the best arguments possible, and genuinely consider the 
culture and historical conditions of the other. These are not presented as naive and 
idealistic. Clearly, the discourse of deliberative democracy can be posed as an 
unreachable idealistic dream, but even Habermas (1984, 1996) recognizes that people 
behave strategically, manipulatively, and often do not measure up to the goals of 
such discourse. Still, the parties must attempt such discourse with a good faith 
commitment that requires them to invoke the Grician (1975) principles of 
communication related to clarity, truth, appropriateness, and sufficiency.  These 
communication habits are probably more achievable than those required of dialogue 
such as empathic listening (Bush & Folger 1994), reconciliation (Kriesberg 1998; 
Ellis 2005), or the host of communication patterns associated with a “dialogic” 
experience (Moaz & Ellis 2006).  
 Although writing about deliberative communicative processes and problem 
solving between groups in conflict can hover in the rarefied air of theory, recent 
work is more empirical and pragmatic. And although few would make grandiose 
claims for deliberation or assume it automatically leads to consensus, there is 
considerable research which demonstrates that under the right conditions 
deliberation encourages a public spirit, promotes tolerance, and broadens 
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perspectives (Dryzek 2000; Mutz 2002; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; Chambers 
2003). Still, challenges remain. For example, the group polarization effects predicts 
that following deliberation group members move to more extreme positions than 
indicated by predeliberation opinions (Sunstein 2002). One explanation of group 
polarization is that group members seek approval and recognition from others and 
therefore align themselves with those of a like mind, and presents themselves as 
champions for a position. The polarization effect is powerful but it still does not 
challenge the general claims of deliberation. Moreover, there is research that poses 
suggestions for overcoming polarization effects (cf. Fishkin 1995; Ackerman & 
Fishkin 2002; Sunstein 2002). 
 Deliberative communication processes have also been criticized for 
insufficient attention to diversity and identity. Original formulations of deliberative 
theory had agreement and consensus as its aim at the expense of recognizing 
differences. The articulation of diversity was traded away for common agreement. 
Moreover, some earlier presentations of deliberative communication privileged a 
narrow western style of argument and reason giving. It was highly rationalistic and 
disadvantaged the reasons of marginalized groups (Young 1996). But deliberating in 
a democracy has responded to these issues by pushing its conceptions of argument 
and reasoning beyond the highly western style model of impartiality. It is now a 
given that deliberative processes accept a more pluralistic notion of reason giving 
(Benhabib 1996). Chambers (2003) explains that “deliberative democracy has 
benefited from the ‘what about. . .’ line of argument. What about aboriginal peoples 
and their use of story telling and greeting, what about African Americans and their 
repertoire of meanings, what about women. . .what about the religious. . .what about 
the oppressed?” (322). Actually, research theorizing about communication and 
deliberation has merged diversity theory with deliberation (Benhabib 2002). There is 
now much more sensitivity to the different perspectives on arguing and reasoning 
represented in different cultures. Work by Maoz and Ellis (2002) has shown how 
Israelis and Palestinians go to what Johnstone (1986) calls “argumentative ground” 
or the point at which you can argue no further. The Maoz and Ellis (2002) analysis 
shows how cultural groups (Israeli-Jews and Palestinians in this case) deploy certain 
rhetorical devices to manage arguments avoid the appearance of bias, and protect 
themselves against counterargument. The recognition of the impact of diversity on 
cultural argument has enriched the debate about deliberative theory by particularizing 
and concretizing the concepts of argument. The challenges of diversity and pluralism 
have moved deliberative theory in necessary directions, but still have not negated its 
core assumptions about public reasoning and the value of moral legitimacy by 
insisting on accountable discussion.  
THE CONDITIONS OF CONTACT AND DELIBERATIVE D I SCOURSE 
 Another concern about deliberative discussion is the conditions of discourse. 
Deliberative discourse is dependent on controlled communication. Controlled 
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communication is the key to using communication to manage and resolve conflict. 
Burton (1969) was an early proponent of controlled communication and he meant 
little more than creating an atmosphere in which participants could talk about issues 
and perceptions and conflict, and use this to develop some common functional 
interests. Controlled communication is simply using a principled communication 
process to try and achieve a goal related to the conflict. This could involve 
preparation for negotiation, issue analysis, mediation, relationship transformation, 
problem solving, reconciliation, identity widening, or anything else. The 
establishment of effective communication—designed to unearth new approaches, 
ideas, and relationships—is one difference between communication approaches and 
earlier more directive third-party approaches to problem resolution. Micro 
communication approaches are less concerned with realistic analyses of negotiation 
outcomes than with innovation and changing relationships. The theory emerges 
more from interpersonal and intergroup levels than the international one. 
 Dialogue groups, which typically have different theoretical assumptions about 
communication, refer to the contact hypothesis as a condition of controlled 
communication. The contact hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp 2000), which is not my 
concern here, is an attempt to control communication in order to maximize the 
possibility of having various communicative effects. Although deliberative 
democracy theories may draw on numerous principles associated with effective 
communicative contact, they differ from dialogic approaches in at least one 
important way. Dialogue group experiences demand privacy, confidentiality, 
discretion, and even secrecy as individuals communicate in intimate ways and groups 
work to transform their relationships (Kriesberg 1998; Maoz & Ellis 2006). But 
deliberative democratic processes require a well-order public sphere. The public 
sphere is not private or secret. On the contrary, it works to produce openness, 
accountability, and accessibility. Equality as a condition of contact is certainly 
necessary for accountability when deliberating. But access to a public space and the 
possibility of creating new forms of public space that are legitimate venues of 
deliberation is a first requirement.  
THE INTERNET AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The creation of public spheres is a genuine problem in an age of individualized 
media and where people “bowl alone” (Putnam 2000). In fact, truly engaging either 
conflicting ethnopolitical groups or citizens who require political involvement is 
difficult and often seems beyond our wherewithal. But modern technology can help 
as well as hinder communicative engagement. The internet can empower individuals 
and make it possible to construct a community of shared interest. In the language of 
the public sphere, the internet can foster points of contact that empower the 
identified groups and draw attention away from other societal systems. It is possible 
to organize contact and the construction of a public sphere between two conflicting 
groups of any type or demographic profile. Groups can be assembled online on the 
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basis of statistically representative samples or around any other profile of 
communicative interest. For instance, in the earlier example of the problems over 
funding for schools in the Israeli-Arab and Jewish community, it would be possible 
to create an online deliberative process—with the goal of both practical problem 
solving and intergroup development—for the school principles, or teachers, or 
students, or any combination. The software for such processes already exists, is easy 
to use, and continues to develop. My argument is that deliberative democratic theory 
can be adapted to the context of ethnopolitical conflict, and that internet 
communication technology opens up new and unique communicative spaces for 
problem solving and intergroup relations. The internet helps satisfy the conditions of 
deliberative democratic processes and makes possible a type of communication that 
allows for self-expression and engagement in debate and discussion of the other. In 
doing so it forms new communities of discourse that can mature into influential 
political bodies and agents for reconciliation. Let’s explore in more detail how this 
works. 
 It remains the case that the “public” sphere must be created. In other words, 
the distinctive qualities of the internet—e.g. speed, access, asynchrony—are not 
particularly important because they can result in negative effects as well as positive 
ones. Conflicting ethnopolitical groups who refuse to engage one another will not be 
convinced by the internet. And computer mediated communication cannot simply 
replace the existing public sphere with electronic contact. Rather, it must constitute a 
public sphere of participants who exhibit the features of dialogue and are interested 
in “publicness.” The deliberative process rooted in the internet mediated public 
sphere must be a viable mechanism for the expansion of dialogue and 
communicative interaction. Thus the possibility of creating unique public spaces, 
which are sometimes inaccessible to others, enables political and social power to be 
distributed in society. The possibility of these internet technology created spheres 
means that groups that use them are less subject to the persuasion of professionals, 
or the influences of their own elites, and more able to participate in a “rational” 
public in the sense the results of the communication more legitimately reflect group 
interests. The point is not to create a site for information but to engage 
neighborhood groups, nongovernmental organizations, political entities, civic 
society, and those with ideological differences in responsive dialogical interaction. As 
long as there are participants from divided societies willing and able to organize 
themselves into a distributed public, there will be an element of civil society with 
transformative capabilities. These participants may come from formal or informal 
organizations and can deliberate on issues of various types. But as an internet 
constructed community develops and becomes a location for group deliberation, it 
transforms itself from a commons to an institutionally organized and entrenched 
democratic space.  
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 Briefly, a deliberative space for conflicting groups needs to be structured with 
certain features in mind (cf. Noveck 2004) and internet technology can enable the 
process quite well. These features include accessibility. Technological availability can be 
a problem but is becoming increasingly available and easy to use. As in any 
deliberative or dialogue group there must be equality with even access to speaking, 
transparency so no rules of the public space are secret or biased, and accountability. The 
public space must be constructed to ensure that participants communicate in such a 
way as to guarantee inclusiveness, information, and a broad spectrum of viewpoints. 
Still, the fact that the technology can create a “rational” public is more important 
than the existence of some intrinsic favorable qualities.  
OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO PUBLIC SPHERE DELIBERATION 
 Up to now we have assumed the positive value of discussion. And, to be sure, 
deliberative discussion improves the quality of reasoning, legitimizes ultimate 
choices, and helps us surpass the limits of our own reasoning and imagination 
(Simon 1983). But a major problem to always overcome for deliberative discussion is 
the fact that people avoid challenging conversations. This could be the result of 
apathy, the threatening nature of politics, uncomfortable interpersonal consequences, 
or any number of personal psychological reasons. Moreover, it is simply difficult to 
be political. There are threats of isolation for expressing political opinions, feelings 
of intellectual inadequacy, ignorance, misperceptions of others, and hesitancy to 
upset group norms (Wyatt, Kim, & Katz 2000). Being genuinely political requires 
work, training, education, and effort that many are unwilling or unable to undertake. 
The question becomes, then, whether or not internet created public spheres can 
overcome any of these obstacles.  
D IVERSITY  
The process of promoting peace or stabilizing politics requires that gaps between 
people be transcended. In other words, deliberative communication is a method of 
securing consensus and helping divided groups coordinate their meanings and 
actions. Cultural, ethnic, and social diversity in societies is responsible for the 
greatest distance between people. Online public spaces facilitate participation from 
more people. It improves the conditions of deliberation by creating a more diverse 
conversational environment. When groups are divided and seeking an avenue for 
contact to work out problems and improve relations the internet can be more 
welcoming for diverse individuals. I am not referring to the use of the internet for a 
meeting of like minds to reinforce one another; but rather the impact of the 
electronic public sphere on perceptions of the communication process. Robinson, 
Neustadtl, and Kestnbaum (2002) concluded that the online environment made it 
easier for users to be more supportive of diversity and different points of view than 
those in face-to-face discussions.  
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It remains true that individuals left on their own to find others online will 
typically end up hearing their own voices, and wall themselves off from others 
thereby maintaining Sunstein’s (2002) fear of polarization. But we must consider the 
specific deliberative task. Online conflict resolution between divided ethnopolitical 
groups begins with diversity and disagreement. It is not an ad hoc collection of users 
reinforcing each other. Moreover, one central tenet of conflict resolution designed to 
halt violence and make progress toward stability is to construct viable agreements. 
Such agreements are based on incompletely theorized agreements as termed by 
Sunstein (1999). These are agreements on particulars or solutions without agreement 
on the abstract moral principles that under gird the agreement. So, for example, an 
environmentalist group and a religious group could agree that an endangered species 
should be protected without agreeing on the reasons. The religious group might 
believe the species is a reflection of God’s work, and the environmentalist, 
completely to the contrary, might believe that the species is the result of evolution 
and necessary for ecological balance. Their agreement to protect the endangered 
species is incompletely theorized in the sense that both groups are clear on what they 
want, but do not agree on the general theory that accounts for it. Internet contact is 
particularly conducive to this type of agreement. This deliberative approach seeks the 
benefits of short term agreement over attempts at the deeper transformational 
change that is the goal of more “dialogic” (Folger & Bush 2001; Maoz & Ellis 2006) 
approaches to conflict resolution. We will further discuss the implications of this in 
the section below. But online contact for the purpose of problem solving between 
contending groups makes it possible to assemble the diverse groups sometimes 
necessary for discussion. It makes it easier to form groups of different shapes, sizes, 
and compositional factors and lowers the access barrier for minority and dissimilar 
voices. 
 Conflicting ethnopolitical groups, as well as any society with diverse 
demographic groups, have subgroups and interests that are not represented by 
leadership. Participation in the conflict resolution process is unequal because of a 
lack of influence and resources. Resources can include numerous things such as time, 
money, and skills, but online opportunities can affect all of these. Teachers, workers, 
government officials, nongovernmental organizations, grassroots groups, and 
citizens of all stripes can lower the barriers to these resources. 
REDUCED CUES 
Certainly, the absence of a “live” physical image on the internet changes the 
impression one can leave as well as altering interpretive practices. It is true that as 
technology evolves the cue environment gets richer (e.g. webcams), but the social 
information for impression formation remains significantly altered. Most online 
deliberative groups rely on verbal language which is more subject to editing and 
control. There are advantages to information and linguistic expression mattering 
more than looks, gender, race, or membership in other social categories; namely, it 
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forces a greater task orientation (Walther 1992). This increases the likelihood that 
arguments are assessed more on their quality than on the social position or image of 
the other person (Dahlberg 2001). This is a special feature of the internet. The 
opportunity to reduce the influences of stereotypes, status, and prejudices of all sorts 
results in improved decision making and participation from lower status others. 
Moreover, written communication tends to be perceived as more serious.  
 Yet, status differences and group identities can creep into messages or be 
revealed offline. And there are potential costs from a reduced cue environment. It 
does blunt politeness norms and cause people to communicate less sensitively. But 
most of this research pertains to internet chat rooms and discussion groups where 
the goal is not necessarily to construct and manage and democratically desirable 
deliberative environment.  When online groups are organized with an eye toward 
maximizing deliberative potential they are controlled for system design and 
implementation with respect to participants, rules of discussion, and include such 
features as moderators (Price & Cappella 2002). Moreover, anonymity is not the goal 
of deliberative discourse. A direct confrontation of others, including their social 
demographics, to solve problems is a goal of online deliberative discourse. Tidwell 
and Walther (2002) found that computer mediated discussions were more task 
oriented but still produced more questions, self-disclosure, and fewer peripheral 
exchanges. The impersonal nature of online communication promotes rationality and 
disciplines the participants toward quality discussion by discouraging group 
interaction that detracts from effectiveness. In short, the impersonal nature of online 
communication enhances group work (Walther 1996). 
IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC D I SCUSSION 
Beyond the question of the interest and value of the online context, there are 
important questions with respect to the usefulness of online communication for 
political discussion. Early portrayals of online work described it as sparse and not 
very encouraging of serious work. But later studies have found advantages for 
deliberative discussion in many features of online interaction. Studies by Price and 
Cappella (2002), for example, argue that the availability of online discussion 
opportunities expands political engagement and improves thoughtfulness on political 
issues. Online discussions can produce reasonable argument-based conversations 
that are not excessively polarizing and lead to serious consideration of issues. The 
Price and Cappella (2002) studies focus on policy issues in the U.S. but there is no 
reason to believe that the advantageous features of online contact should not accrue 
to political groups. Participants are engaged in the process and there is an increase in 
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DELIBERATIVE COMMUNICATION 
 One of my principle arguments in this essay is that deliberative 
communication, which is oriented toward controlled discussion and problem solving, 
can improve relations between conflicting ethnopolitical groups. This is as opposed 
to dialogic strategies, which claim that deeper cultural and psychological engagement 
is necessary to transform relationships. Deliberative processes seek agreement at 
lower levels of abstraction that are, in Sunstein’s (1999) terms, “incompletely 
theorized” but solve practical problems and establish a foundation for deeper 
agreement to emerge. Deliberative discourse seeks a public space by which groups 
can confront one another on a problem and produce binding results; results that 
have attendant psychological and attitudinal benefits as well as practical and political 
benefits. Below are qualities of deliberative communication that characterize the 
deliberative context. They are of course not exhaustive but fundamentally related to 
the benefits of deliberation and the process of managing conflict between groups. 
 One of the problems posed by anyone making decisions is how to process 
information. In other words, even with the best information one could gather it is 
never exactly obvious how to use the information. This is because problems are 
complex and humans are limited. This is the problem of bounded rationality termed by 
Simon (1983). Very simply, deliberation increases the odds of making better choices 
because individuals can step beyond the boundaries of their own abilities and interact 
with others. They can participate in the intelligence of others and have their own 
intelligence stimulated in new ways. Moreover, conflicting groups are often 
motivated to deceive the other. They withhold information, motivations, and 
manipulate information for strategic reasons. This is because there are usually 
incentives to misrepresent information and gain advantage. But deliberative 
discussion improves the availability and clarity of information. Even if I believe that 
someone has strong reasons to manipulate me, it sharpens the consideration of my 
own information. And the opportunity to see things from the others perspective is 
improved by deliberation. This is related to the problem of bounded rationality 
because my own information and experiences limit the extent to which I can 
conceive of things in any other way. Numerous studies point to the value and 
effectiveness of communicative contact where members of conflicting groups 
transcend their limits and find new ways to solve problems with former enemies (cf. 
Hertz-Lazarowitz & Eden 2002). Wittes (2005), in her analysis of negotiations 
between Israelis and Palestinians, stated that “the small teams who met repeatedly 
over months in Oslo built a common language and a common view of their task that 
enabled them to overcome obstacles” (140-141). This is recognition of the 
multiplicative effects that deliberative discussion has on the available intelligence 
applied to problems.  
 The “engagement with others” is one of the strengths of the deliberative 
process. This is particularly important for the decision making process because 
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although there are times for secrecy (e.g. balloting), deliberative communication forces a 
particular form of justification. In other words, it makes relying purely on self interest 
difficult if not impossible. At its core, deliberative communication is based on 
disagreement, but more importantly “skilled disagreement.” There is much to skilled 
disagreement—e.g. task focus, knowledgeable use of reasoning and evidence, 
perspective taking, etc.—but these details are not my the concern here. There is a 
presupposition toward justifying claims by logical means. This implies a treatment of 
issues with respect to advantages and disadvantages in search of novel and 
acceptable solutions. There is more to this than the familiar call for reasoned 
discourse reminiscent of high school civics. Online deliberation in particular is a 
process of moving from personal opinion to group judgment. It helps conflicting 
groups progress from the constrictions of selfish interests to choices based the 
inclusion of others. One criticism of deliberation is that it is elitist and that minority 
or disadvantaged groups must rely on passions. But passions (symbolic passions) are 
certainly within the traditions of deliberative communication and may still be 
analyzed rhetorically as substantive and matched with reason. Moreover, as Gutmann 
and Thompson (1996) explain, the argument that rational deliberative discourse 
favors an established order lacks historical perspective, and “Most of the force of 
radical criticism of society in the past has relied on rationalist challenges to the status 
quo” (134). Even the telling of a personal story or narrative (Bar-On 2000) can be 
part of the deliberative process as a step toward reaching consensus on difficult 
issues. Moreover, narrative structures are certainly subject to argumentative analysis. 
 In some cases, a group can reach an agreement and it requires little of the 
group members with respect to implementation or compliance. It is more likely that 
a collective decision will benefit from a group commitment to the decision. 
Deliberative communication improves participation and increases cohesive consensus. A 
collective decision following deliberation has the psychological benefit of 
commitment by group members because of the nature of the communication. The 
process of subjecting communication to stricter argumentative criteria and exceeding 
the boundaries of one’s own rationality prompt proposals that are more “public” in 
nature; that is, they represent the attitudes and opinions of the participants and they 
are more committed to the results. Simply the opportunity to speak and have a say 
increases support for the outcome of discussion. Moreover, deliberative 
communication draws theoretical sustenance from democratic communication which 
emphasizes processes rather than outcomes. People in mature polities are accepting 
of political decisions even if they do not agree with them, because they accept the 
process as adequate or fair. The principles of deliberative communication have 
substantial legitimacy since they are grounded in those individuals most affected by 
the outcome. As Manin (1987) makes clear, the source of legitimacy in decisions is 
not the will of the majority but the outcome of the idea formation process. The 
sense of liberty and respect that groups benefit from comes from a process of 
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research, discussion of alternatives, and the social exchange of reasons and 
arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
 My argument here has been two fold. On the one hand, I have developed the 
potential to develop electronic public space for deliberative processes. This has 
drawn on the traditions of democratic discourse as a mechanism for transforming 
relationships between groups. The idea that working on a practical problem 
separating two groups, and doing this by approximating as closely as possible the 
conditions of deliberative democratic discourse, produces group outcomes beneficial 
to conflict resolution has been a main theme of this analysis. On the other hand, the 
internet permits a form of discourse that result in participants addressing each other 
in a type of interaction that is normative and incurs mutual obligations. If these 
obligations are preserved and broadened then a new public sphere and a new 
discursive environment is possible. This new environment addresses certain 
problems and opens us the possibility of a future more inclusive community.  
 A mutual obligation and interdependence that is conducive to conflict 
resolution is possible only in a democratic form of communication that is responsive 
to differences, plurality, and multiple perspectives. Online communities are posed as 
interesting and potential contexts for reorganizing conversation. If this ultimately 
enables conflicting groups to solve problems across borders and publics then it does 
so as a mechanism not just of discourse but good discourse. 
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